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Abstract
The New York State Milk Price Gouging Law establishes that the retail 
prices of ﬂuid milk products are not to exceed 200% of the prices that 
NYS milk processors py for Class I milk. The enforcement of this law 
signiﬁcantly affected the nature of the Class I ﬂuid milk price trans-
mission process and the milk pricing strategies of supermarkets in the 
ﬁve largest cities in New York State: New York City, Albany, Syracuse, 
Buffalo and Rochester. 
During  the  pre-law  period,  supermarkets  used  a  retail  price-
stabilization strategy, as evidenced by asymmetric Class I ﬂuid milk 
price transmission. In contrast, supermarkets use a retail proﬁt stabili-
zation strategy during the law period. 
This  variation of retail milk price control actually creates  an  institu-
tional environment that facilitates cooperative conduct of supermar-
kets,  acting  in  an  oligopolistic  market  environment,  which  caused 
greater instability in retail milk prices.  Differences in the competitive 
environments of each city impact the effects of the statewide law.
Farm milk prices become more volatile following the col-
lapse of Dairy Price Support Program in the late 1980s.
A large drop in the Class I Price in early 1990 was 
matched by a far smaller drop in retail prices, illustrated 
here with prices applicable to New York City.  This 
caused dairy farmers to cry foul.
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TO:    Retailers of Milk         
 
DATE:  September 21, 2007 
 
SUBJECT:  Announcement of threshold price relative to milk price gouging law, 
effective OCTOBER 2007. 
 
Threshold prices are unchanged from the previous month.  For OCTOBER 2007, 
threshold prices for milk, lowfat milk, or skim milk offered for retail sale in the state are: 
 
                      Half 
                Gallon   Gallon   Quart 
 
Metro Region: 
  (NYC and Counties of Nassau,      $4.54    $2.32    $1.20 
  Suffolk, Rockland, Westchester, 
  Orange, Putnam and Dutchess) 
 
Upstate Region: 
  (Remaining Counties)        $4.33    $2.21    $1.14 
 
 
A retailer who sells above the threshold price may be in violation of the law unless such 
selling price is justified as not being unconscionably excessive.  Such justification 
includes net invoice price paid for the milk item plus actual costs incurred in handling 
and selling that milk item. 
 
Please be advised that the threshold price is only changed if there is at least a $0.02 
per gallon ($0.23/cwt) change in the underlying price for Class I (fluid) milk at 3.5% 
butterfat.  This is the second consecutive month that the threshold remains unchanged. 
Compared to the base month (August 2007) of the current threshold price, the federal 
order Class 1 for October decreased $0.17 per hundredweight ($0.015/gallon).  On a 
monthly basis, the federal order Class I price (3.5% butterfat) for October decreased 
$0.32/cwt or $0.028/gallon.  The threshold price is calculated by multiplying by two the 
total of two components, the minimum federal order price and the premium paid for 
Class I milk. 
 
Following the implementation of the Milk Price Gouging 
Law (MPGL) in June 1991, NYC Retail Prices began to 
follow a pattern very similar to that of monthly Class I 
prices, in marked contrast to the pre-law patterns.
The patterns observed in NYC differ from the averages ob-
served in Federal Order markets not in their broad sweep but 
in the smaller monthly changes.  Nationally, retailers engage 
in a “price smoothing” strategy that resists smaller changes 
in input prices but follows larger and/or longer trends, both 
up and down.  This strategy means that losses incurred when 
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION         O c t o b e r   2 0 0 8  
 
 
Milk Price Gouging Law, Section 396-rr of GBL 
 
The milk price gouging law applies to the retail sale of fluid milk in consumer packages.  The 
law  was  enacted  in  June  1991  at  the  same  time  as  the  legislation  that  permitted  the 
Commissioner to implement an Interim Milk Pricing Order.  At that time farm prices had fallen 
considerably while retail prices, particularly in the Metropolitan New York area, had fallen only a 
small amount. 
 
Traditionally as a means of administering and enforcing the law, the Department calculated and 
announced an enforcement measure known as the “threshold price”.  It was established for two 
broad regions of the state for a quart, half gallon, and gallon container.  The threshold price 
generally changed monthly, moving up or down two cents per gallon for every one cent gallon 
change in the farm price.  The threshold price was not a maximum price and was geared to 
supermarkets. 
 
Effective November 2008, the Department will discontinue announcing the monthly threshold 
price and will focus on the store’s gross margin to determine compliance with the Milk Price 
Gouging Law.  In considering whether a retail price appears unconscionably excessive, the 
Department uses a retail margin standard of $0.58 per gallon, $0.37 per half gallon, and $0.26 
per quart.  Retail margin standard equals total in-store handling costs plus net profit (before 
taxes).  If a retail price has a gross margin (retail price minus net invoice price) that does not 
exceed  the  retail  margin  standard,  the  price  is  considered  justified.    If  the  gross  margin  is 
greater than the retail margin standard, then unit cost documentation is required to justify the 
price, unless it is terminated.  Justification must be in light of the net invoice price paid for the 
milk item and the actual cost per unit to handle and sell it.  If the justification is not accepted by 
the Commissioner, the case is required by statute to be referred to the Attorney General. 
 
If you have any questions, please call 518-457-5731.   
 
























1.16 2.09 3.84 2.05 3.74 1.99 3.74 1.95 Albany 3.64
1.17 2.09 3.65 2.05 3.58 1.99 3.70 1.95 Amsterdam 3.43
1.16 2.09 3.69 2.05 3.59 1.99 3.78 1.95 Gl'sville/J'twn 3.46
1.15 2.01 3.73 1.98 3.65 1.93 3.62 1.90 Schenectady 3.54
1.16 2.08 3.84 2.04 3.74 1.98 3.69 1.94 Troy 3.60
1.16 2.07 3.80 2.03 3.70 1.97 3.70 1.94 Weighted Average 3.59
Central NY
1.17 2.11 3.04 2.08 2.93 2.10 2.96 2.06 Auburn 2.83
1.15 2.15 3.67 2.10 3.44 2.11 3.59 2.09 Rome 3.44
1.14 2.18 2.92 2.14 2.83 2.15 2.71 2.14 Syracuse 2.69
1.15 2.07 3.36 2.03 3.30 1.99 3.30 1.98 Utica 3.24
1.15 2.15 3.08 2.11 2.98 2.11 2.93 2.10 Weighted Average 2.88
Southern Tier
1.04 1.86 3.13 1.82 2.97 1.76 2.95 1.57 Binghamton 2.69
1.14 2.18 2.99 2.16 2.89 2.16 2.93 2.15 Elmira 2.82
1.16 2.15 3.15 2.08 3.05 2.18 3.07 2.15 Ithaca 2.93
1.09 2.00 3.10 1.96 2.97 1.95 2.97 1.84 Weighted Average 2.77
Hudson Valley
1.16 2.11 3.83 2.08 3.72 2.03 3.78 2.00 Kingston 3.58
1.15 2.11 3.87 2.08 3.84 2.10 3.90 2.07 Newburgh 3.78
1.09 2.01 3.98 2.01 3.97 2.00 3.96 1.99 Poughkeepsie 3.95
1.12 2.06 3.92 2.04 3.88 2.03 3.91 2.02 Weighted Average 3.83
Western NY
1.12 2.04 3.46 2.02 3.36 1.99 3.37 1.99 Batavia 3.20
1.12 2.17 3.06 2.17 2.94 2.17 2.87 2.17 Buffalo 2.76
1.10 2.05 3.24 2.01 3.12 2.01 3.04 2.01 Niagara F/NTona 2.96
1.14 2.20 2.97 2.20 2.86 2.19 2.77 2.19 Rochester 2.67
1.13 2.17 3.04 2.17 2.93 2.16 2.85 2.16 Weighted Average 2.75
Unregulated
1.14 2.20 2.93 2.17 2.83 2.17 2.84 2.17 Jamestown 2.70
1.19 2.11 3.83 2.08 3.67 2.02 3.72 2.00 Plattsburgh 3.56
1.15 2.15 3.96 2.12 3.90 2.10 3.89 2.08 Watertown 3.76
1.16 2.16 3.57 2.13 3.47 2.11 3.48 2.09 Weighted Average 3.34
Upstate Average 1.13 2.10 3.42 2.07 3.32 2.06 3.31 2.02 3.19
  * = Insufficient number of observations to report.
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Table 6. The OLS estimation results of the response of retail prices to changes in the Class I fluid 
milk prices: New York City, Albany, Syracuse, Buffalo and Rochester. 
 Variable  Whole milk sold in gallon containers  Whole milk sold in half-gallon containers 
Pre-law period  Law period  Pre-law period  Law period 
New York City  
N_CIP  1.01* (5.30)  1.94* (24.40)  1.35* (5.16)  2.00* (25.48) 
Constant  0.14* (7.70)  -0.21* (-8.03)  0.11* (8.61)  -0.14* (-9.71) 
DW-statistic  0.08  0.23  0.06  0.23  
R2  0.32  0.81  0.32  0.81 
Syracuse  
S_CIP  1.47* (5.84)  0.73* (10.75)  1.60* (6.03)  1.89* (37.45) 
Constant  0.15* (6.30)  -0.17* (-9.21)  0.09* (6.80)  -0.06* (-9.90) 
DW-statistic  0.07  0.57   0.08   1.04 
R2  0.36  0.53  0.37   0.96 
Albany  
A_CIP  0.67* (6.67)  1.55* (19.70)  0.65* (5.49)  1.80* (23.90) 
Constant  0.11* (10.86)  -0.19* (-9.43)  0.07* (11.84)  -0.03* (-2.86) 
DW-statistic  0.32  0.75  0.34  0.59 
R2  0.43  0.81  0.33   0.88 
Buffalo 
B_CIP  0.67* (2.59)  0.89* (12.27)  0.77* (2.50)  2.02* (45.80) 
Constant  0.10* (5.30)  -0.11* (-6.03)  0.06* (5.27)  -0.07* (-7.22) 
DW-statistic  0.04  0.32  0.06   0.27  
R2  0.18  0.53  0.17   0.88 
Rochester  
R_CIP  0.91* (4.06)  0.73* (7.17)  0.87* (3.24)  1.95* (40.30) 
Constant  -0.001 (-0.08)  -0.14* (-5.89)  0.01 (1.48)  -0.12* (-13.49) 
DW-statistic  0.10  0.15  0.06  0.35 
R2  0.32  0.34   0.24   0.90 
The table entries are the estimated coefficients (Z-ratios). 
*The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at a 10% significance level; Ho: !=0 and Ha: !"0; 
the Z-statistic rejection regions are (-#;-1.64] and [1.64; +#). The Z-statistics are calculated based on the 
autocorrelation-robust standard errors adjusted using Newey-West approach. 
 
Prior to the Milk Price Gouging Law
	 There is asymmetry in the transmission of changes in the Class I prices to retail prices during the pre-law period. The null hypothesis of symmetry of the effects of increases 
and decreases in the Class I prices on changes in the retail prices is rejected in all analyzed cases. Increases in the Class I prices are transmitted more completely than decreases, 
which is similar to the empirical evidence reported by other studies. There is no striking difference in the price-transmission patterns across the cities and whole milk container 
sizes, although there are some city-speciﬁc and container-speciﬁc variations.
After the Milk Price Gouging Law
	 The estimation results characterizing the law period reveal a completely different price-transmission pattern. The null hypothesis of symmetric transmission of increases and 
decreases in the Class I prices to retail prices is rejected. The magnitude of the estimated coefﬁcients for the Class I price increases and decreases as well as their comparison 
with the pre-law period suggest that retail prices respond to increases and decreases in the Class I ﬂuid milk prices in a symmetric manner in all analyzed cases in the law period. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the estimated coefﬁcients for both increases and decreases in the Class I price is higher in the law period as compared to the pre-law period.
Pooled Data Analysis of Regime Shift
In cases where the NYSDAM maximum retail price threshold is estimated to be binding, Class I price increases are transmitted at a higher rate than Class I price decreases. In 
contrast, in cases where the NYSDAM maximum retail price threshold is not binding, Class I price decreases are transmitted at a higher rate than Class I price increases.  Al-
though, whole milk gallons in Albany were not priced at the NYSDAM threshold, the price-transmission pattern characterizing this case was more consistent with the pattern for 
New York City, rather than the rest of Upstate New York cities.  This may indicate a difference in the local competitive environments across Upstate NY.
Retail Pricing Strategies
	 The NYS MPG Law had a signiﬁcant effect on the nature of the Class I ﬂuid milk price-transmission process and supermarket pricing strategies in the ﬂuid whole milk market. 
Prior to the enactment of the law, supermarkets used the retail price stabilization strategy. 
	 The empirical evidence on the asymmetric response of changes in retail prices and marketing margins to increases and decreases in the Class I ﬂuid milk prices is an indication 
of the presence of this type of strategy.  
	 In contrast, during the period of enforcement of the MPGL 200% rule, supermarkets used the retail proﬁt stabilization strategy. The empirical evidence on the symmetric re-
sponse of changes in retail prices and marketing margins to increases and decreases in the Class I ﬂuid milk prices may indicate a presence of this strategy. 
Ironically, inasmuch as the law was framed to protect consumers from price gouging, the effect of the law may well have 
been to ensure that a kind of price gouging did occur.
Advanced public announcements of the NYSDAM maximum retail price thresholds in conjunction with the advanced 
public announcements of the Class I ﬂuid milk prices on a monthly basis created an institutional environment that facilitated 
cooperative conduct of retailers acting in an oligopolistic market environment. In this type of market environment, the retail 
proﬁt stabilization strategy was more proﬁtable for retailers than the retail price-stabilization strategy.  Prevented from main-
taining adequate absolute margins when input prices were very low, retailers found it appealing, if not necessary, to take 
advantage of high absolute margins when input prices were high.
As a result of this study, NYSDAM stopped announcing a monthly Threshold price, to avoid its anchoring effect.  The 
MPG Law remains in effect.
A long history of dairy data collection, price 
regulation and plant and store inspection 
facilitates implementation and enforcement 
of the law